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Abstract 
Gender economics is a relatively new field, especially in the realm of trade studies. This 
paper seeks to answer the question of how the various regional trade blocs in Latin America 
have affected women’s equality and participation in the economy. It provides an overview of 
the existing literature on the gender-biased effects of liberalization and the current research 
on the gender-differentiated effects of six major regional trade blocs in the Western 
Hemisphere: Mercosur, NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, ALBA-TCP, CAN and Caricom. Using 
STATA software and linear regression analysis, the paper finds that 1) RTAs in the Western 
Hemisphere did not have a significant effect on introducing anti-discriminatory policies, 
changing wage inequality over time or increasing female labor force participation. 2) 
Mercosur has had a slightly negative effect on FLFP and Caricom has been negatively 
associated with the presence of domestic sexual harassment laws. 3) Only CAN was effective 
at increasing female labor force participation in the first years after signing the agreement. 4) 
Sexual harassment laws are not associated with higher levels of FLFP or wage equality; and 
finally 5) greater levels of land per person are associated with decreased levels of FLFP. 
Small sample sizes and low variation limited the robustness and scope of this study.   
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Introduction 
 
“In the absence of public policy, globalization alone cannot and will not make gender inequality go 
away. Despite significant increases in agency and in access to economic opportunities for many 
women in many countries, large gaps remain in some areas. Public action… is therefore necessary for 
countries to fully capitalize on the potential for globalization as a force for development and greater 
gender inequality.”1 
-World Bank World Development Report 2012 
 
Free trade is not a new idea in Latin America. Some regional trade agreements date 
back to the 1960s, and even Simon Bolivar, referred to as El Libertador of South America, 
promoted trade liberalization with the former imperial powers.
2
 But until recently, the effects 
that trade liberalization policies have had on women have been understudied and sometimes 
ignored completely. Of the seven major free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere, 
not one preamble mentions enhancing the welfare of the resident female populations. Trade 
liberalization can affect the nature and availability of market (and non-market) activities open 
to women, both in and out of the home. It can affect women’s bargaining power by altering 
the potential share of household income (and total income) that women are able to earn.
3
 
Research has shown that gains from trade can be hampered by gender inequalities, so it is to 
each bloc’s detriment that they ignore this important segment of society.4,5,6  
Aside from social norms and social roles within the household, inequalities are 
institutionalized by disparities in access to education, credit, labor markets and control over 
resources. The discrepancies create inequality traps for women, which lower aggregate 
growth and decrease economic opportunities that would otherwise be created by trade 
                                                          
1
 (World Bank, 2011) 
2
 (Lynch, 2008, f161) 
3
 (Ventura-Dias, 2010, VI) 
4
 (Bussolo and de Hoyos, 2009) 
5
 (World Bank, 2011) 
6
 (Cagatay, 2001, 18) 
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liberalization.
7
 Over the past two decades, Latin America and the Caribbean have seen 
significant increases in female labor force participation (FLFP) which, as of 2010, was 
hovering around 57%.
8
 However, FLFP and female wages still lag behind their male 
equivalents.
9
 A study by Oostendorp finds that “the occupational wage gap tends to decrease 
with increasing economic development, at least in richer countries; and to decrease with trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in richer countries, but [does not find evidence] that trade 
and FDI also reduce the occupational gender wage gap in poorer countries.”10 Data from the 
Western Hemisphere collected by this author from the Global Gender Gap Report in 2009 
and 2013 support this argument, showing that the U.S. and Canada have experienced 
increased wage inequality and developing countries in the region show both increases and 
decreases on a country by country basis.
11
 
But trade alone cannot get rid of every obstacle facing women’s full and equal 
participation in the economy. The 2012 World Bank Development Report explains the 
‘productivity trap’ that prevent women from engaging in the economy to the same extent (and 
from reaping the same benefits) as their male counterparts. The three parts of the trap are: 
access to economic opportunities, gender differences in time use (especially care 
responsibilities), and access to productive inputs. Each part of the trap reinforces the other 
two parts, creating a cycle of inequality. For example, with limited access to productive 
inputs women are less able to access new economic opportunities and therefore have a 
comparative advantage in domestic and care work, which then lowers their ability to access 
new productive inputs and economic opportunities.
12
 The segregation caused by the trap is 
inefficient because women are being prevented from maximizing their productivity. The 
                                                          
7
 (Bussolo and de Hoyos, 2009) 
8
 (GTZ et al, 2010) 
9
 (Ibid.) 
10
 (Oostendorp, 2009) 
11
 (World Economic Forum, 2013) 
12
 (World Development Report, 2011) 
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Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) said 
that “gender inequality is not only a legitimate policy goal by itself, as better opportunities for 
women lead to improvements in human development; it is also highly desirable from an 
efficiency perspective. Societies where income inequality and discrimination against 
particular kinds of individuals are lower tend to grow faster. The strong correlation between 
the gender gap, economic development and national competitiveness suggests the importance 
of incorporating gender equality into policymaking.”13 
Because of issues like the poverty trap, it is the intention of this paper to determine if 
trade blocs in the Western Hemisphere have effectively developed other policies to benefit 
their female populations. I therefore ask the question: how have the major trading blocs in the 
Western Hemisphere promoted or discouraged women’s equality and participation in the 
economy?   
The regional trading blocs in the Western Hemisphere are very diverse; each bloc 
varies in the level of influence it exerts over its member countries. On one end of the 
spectrum, NAFTA and the Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) could be considered very minimal because the agreements are limited only to 
the realm of trade and economy. Members are required to protect intellectual property rights, 
work to abolish subsidies, and expand trade in a way that promotes labor rights and 
environmental sustainability, but little else is required. On the other hand, the Caribbean 
Common Market (Caricom) and the Southern Market (Mercosur) seek to be much more than 
just trade agreements. Mercosur has established an imperfect customs union and requires 
member countries to maintain democratic elections. Caricom seeks to become even more 
unified as a ‘single market and economy’ (CSME) and has made significant strides towards 
this goal despite political obstacles.  
                                                          
13
 (UNCTAD, 2009) 
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It is important to understand how free trade affects women because trading blocs in 
the Western Hemisphere are becoming increasingly relevant and powerful institutions. 
Additionally, women have historically been, and continue to be, disenfranchised and 
underemployed; yet the number of female-headed households throughout the hemisphere is 
on the rise.
14
  The critical nature of this research is revealed by the estimate of the World 
Development Report 2012 which found that the gender productivity gap could be reduced by 
1/3 to 1/2 and total output per worker could increase by 3-25% just by eliminating the 
barriers that prevent women from working in certain sectors and industries.
15
  
I have hypothesized that cultural norms (here operationalized by the presence of 
workplace sexual harassment laws) should both effect various economic indicators including 
female labor force participation, and also be affected by various policy initiatives set forth by 
different trade blocs. I would also like to determine if any specific policies or regulations in 
any of the agreements have directly affected women’s employment. It should also be true that 
the trading blocs that are more sensitive to development issues, such as CAN and ALBA, 
should be more effective at addressing the barriers which prevent women from fully 
participating in the economy. 
This paper consists of eight sections. The first section gives background information 
on the causes and events that have led to the current make up of trade blocs in the Western 
Hemisphere. A literature review covering the current knowledge of the gendered aspects of 
trade, worldwide and specifically in Latin America, comprises the second section. The third 
section will delve deeper into the original hypothesis stated above, and explain the 
methodology of the project. The cases for the study are presented in section five, which is 
                                                          
14
 (Arriagada, 2002) 
15
 (World Bank, 2011) 
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followed by a discussion of the findings in section six. Some concluding remarks and the 
works referenced compose the final two sections. 
Background 
The ‘Lost Decade’, Neoliberalism, and the Washington 
Consensus  
 After World War Two, economies all over the world began to boom, especially in 
developing regions like Asia and Latin America. Borrowing from foreign creditors sky-
rocketed to fund new development projects. Unfortunately, Latin American countries, though 
receiving loans just as vigorously, were not growing nearly as fast as the developing Asian 
countries across the Pacific. Massive budget deficits, inflation, and debts began to pile up, 
causing macro-economic imbalances which made the region incredibly vulnerable when the 
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States began to pursue anti-inflationary monetary 
policies. These policies ultimately caused an appreciation of the dollar and increased interest 
rates, which put a squeeze on Latin American debtors since most debts were owed in U.S. 
dollars. It became increasingly clear that most Latin American countries would have 
difficulty repaying their loans, and suddenly the credit market for Latin America borrowers 
dried up. Living standards eroded as poverty rates, which had fallen in the time since WWII, 
began to rise again. Ultimately, everything boiled over in August of 1982 when Mexico ran 
out of reserves and Jesus Silva-Herzog, Mexico’s Finance Minister, was forced to declare 
what the world had feared: Mexico would not be able to pay back its foreign debt.
 16
 Other 
countries soon followed, and the result was the beginning of the ‘Lost Decade’, a period of 
stagnate or even decreasing growth rates throughout Latin America.
17
  
                                                          
16
 (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, 21-22) 
17
 (McKay, 2010) 
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It soon became apparent that Latin American economies were in need of international 
aid. Thus in 1989, the Washington Consensus was proposed by the U.S. government in 
collaboration with the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
18
 
The Washington Consensus promoted ‘structural adjustment programs’ which emphasized 
macroeconomic stability, decreasing barriers to trade, privatization, protecting intellectual 
property rights, fiscal discipline, and generally reducing the role of the state. Nations plagued 
by debt were encouraged to take out loans from the IMF, which were available provided that 
countries were willing to bring their domestic policies in-line with the ideals of the 
Washington Consensus. The most lasting effect of these policies was to spur a new era of 
liberalization in Latin America. As countries decreased obstacles to trade, they also created 
new trading blocs and reinvested in existing blocs on both a regional and global scale. 
FTAs, RTAs and the FTAA 
Developing countries have many incentives to liberalize trade with developed 
countries. Push factors are incentives to break from the status quo of protectionism, and pull 
factors are incentives to liberalize trade with a developed country. For example, pull factors 
may include seeking to gain greater market access or other concessions that competitor 
developing countries don’t have, or to attract more FDI. Push factors can include avoiding the 
perceived risk of losing competitiveness with other countries that are liberalizing. These 
factors help to explain why, on December 11, 1994, thirty-four American nations (which did 
not include Cuba) met in Miami, Florida for the first Summit of the Americas to discuss 
creating a free trade bloc throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. The Summit was the 
result of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative proposed by the Bush Sr. administration 
during the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico. Bush envisioned that NAFTA could be 
extended ‘from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego’ to create “a continental base from which the U.S. 
                                                          
18
 (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, 23) 
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could lead the Post-Cold War World, starting with reaffirming its leadership in the Western 
Hemisphere.”19 Of course, an economically united Western Hemisphere would also be useful 
to the United States in negotiating against the European Union and Japan in the WTO.
20
  
The Clinton administration made the FTAA its top priority in Latin American foreign 
policy; but despite this commitment, the first summit meeting, and the following three over 
the next 11 years, was inconclusive.
 21
 Brazil represented the most significant source of 
opposition against any extension of NAFTA or any FTAA that resembled NAFTA, mainly 
due to its position of power in the region (although other members of Mercosur, Chile and 
members of the ALBA agreement were also in opposition.) Brazil saw the FTAA as “an 
obstacle to the designs of Brazilian leadership within the regional order in South America."
22
  
Brazil had significant motivation for promoting the status quo of consolidating 
Mercosur and preventing the creation of an FTAA. Schvarzer explains the three main reasons 
Brazil would have been reluctant to let go of Mercosur for an FTAA. First, Brazil’s 
relationship with Europe and the EU has benefitted from its position of power within 
Mercosur. Second, Brazil has already invested a significant amount of time and “diplomatic 
and political capital” in Mercosur.23 Finally, Brazil has not yet forgotten the pain of its most 
recent financial crisis in the ‘80s. A more consolidated Mercosur would have a stabilizing 
effect on the economy and could also be a source of emergency relief in the event of another 
crisis.
24
 
Other countries objected to the FTAA because it would mean the destruction of the 
trading bloc of which they were already a member. Many of the other trading blocs have 
                                                          
19
 (Phillips, 2003, 331) 
20
 (Stokes, 2001) 
21
 (Teixeira, 2011, 191) 
22
 (Cervo and Bueno, 2008, 488) 
23
 (Schvarzer, 821) 
24
 (Ibid.). 
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stipulations that go far beyond what the FTAA would have enacted. For instance, Mercosur 
requires that all member countries maintain democratic governments and exercises control 
over member countries’ memberships in other agreements (although in practice this is rarely 
enforced, having been exercised only once since 1991.)  
In November 2003, Brazil and Argentina (both part of Mercosur) signed an agreement 
that pledged the two countries would fight together to support their agricultural interests in 
the world economy and thus reject any NAFTA-style FTAA.
25
 They rejected the most recent 
proposal for an FTAA in 2005, citing unfair U.S. agricultural subsidies as the main point of 
contention.
26
 In response, the Clinton administration declared that Mercosur was harmful to 
the creation of the FTAA and a threat to hemispheric regionalism.
27
 Ultimately, the last 
Summit of the Americas meeting failed to create the FTAA in 2005. The only conclusion was 
that 26 of the 34 countries (the members of ALBA uniformly rejected all plans for an FTAA 
modeled after NAFTA) agreed to a meeting (which would never actually take place) in 2006. 
After much debate, the summit concluded that 
The necessary conditions to implement a balanced and equal free trade 
agreement still do not exist: the effective access to markets free of 
subsidies and distortive business practices, which take into account the 
needs and sensitivities of all business partners, including in their levels of 
development and the size of their economies.
28
 
Since the negotiation failure, regional trade blocs (RTAs) have become increasingly 
consolidated and powerful in the Western Hemisphere. Because fewer and typically more 
similar nations are involved, RTAs are much easier to negotiate than multilateral trade 
agreements (MTAs). However, RTAs undermine the goals of the WTO because, while they 
can act to enhance trade in some ways, typically they are cited as detracting from freer trade. 
                                                          
25
 (Cervo and Bueno, 2008, 488) 
26
 Dyer, 2003, 15) 
27
 (Bernier and Roy, 1999, 69) 
28
 (Medina, 2012) 
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They can maximize trade by supporting full employment, sharing access to resources and 
know-how, and removing ‘invisible barriers’ by increasing infrastructure development which 
can increase market access for small producers in new markets.
29,30
 RTAs can detract from 
freer trade, however, if they divert trade from more efficient non-member countries to less-
efficient RTA-member countries.
31
 Theoretically, influential special interest groups could 
also cause rampant trade diversion by inducing governments to add distortionary measures to 
the agreements. There is also a fear that a focus on regional agreements will detract from the 
broader goal of global liberalization, ultimately undermining multilateralism.
32
  
Despite the concerns, there are currently seven major regional trade agreements in 
effect in the Western Hemisphere: Mercosur, NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, CAN (Community of 
Andean Nations), ALBA, CARICOM, and the Pacific Alliance. Membership for each 
agreement are shown in the table below, however this paper will exclude the Pacific Alliance, 
signed in February of 2014, because it is too early for the effects of the agreement to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 (UNCTAD, 2007, VII) 
30
 (Cernat, 2001) 
31
 (UNCTAD, 2007, 61) 
32
 (Freund and Ornelas, 2010) 
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Table 1. Member countries of agreements in the Western Hemisphere. Compiled by author 
RTA Year 
established 
Member Countries Associate 
Members 
Former 
Members 
Mercosur 1991, 
amended 
1994 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Guayana, Peru 
and Suriname 
 
NAFTA 1994 United States, Canada, Mexico   
CAFTA-DR 2004 United States, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua 
  
ALBA 2004 Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, 
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Venezuela 
Suriname  
CARICOM 1973, revised 
in 2001 
Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, 
Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Anguilla, 
Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
 
Andean 
Community 
(CAN) 
1969, revised 
in 1996 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Peru 
 Chile, 
Venezuela 
 
Literature Review: Gender and Free Trade 
 Basic economic theory underlying trade studies 
 Before diving into the literature review, it will be important to understand a few key 
economic principals regarding trade. First, the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) Model in its most 
simple form states that comparative advantages in production lead to international 
specialization after liberalization. The structural change in production causes a country to 
reallocate its inputs towards sectors which use the country’s abundant production factor most 
intensely. The Stolper-Samuelson Theory builds off the HO model, stating that the structural 
13 
 
change in resource allocation causes real returns on the abundant factors to increase, while 
real returns on the non-abundant factors decrease.  
The Balassa-Samuelson theory builds on the previous models to postulate an effect on 
wages. Essentially, wages will be determined by the marginal product of labor (MPL) and 
prices in the tradable goods sector, which will then affect the wages in the non-tradable goods 
sector as workers transfer across sectors. The Balassa-Samuelson model is slightly 
complicated in the short-run in a few ways pertinent to this study. First, the Specific-Factor 
Model shows that certain factors are specific to certain industries in the short term, and are 
therefore fixed. In fact, (unskilled) labor is the only factor of production that can move across 
sectors in the short-term. Second, men and women tend to be imperfect substitutes into the 
medium-term.
33,34,35
 Edwards and Edwards show that gender segregation by sector may 
contribute to making labor fixed, at least in the medium-term, which affects the rate which 
wages equalize across industries.
36
  
Literature Review 
Gender studies in general are a relatively new field in academia, and this is especially 
apparent in free trade research. According to Ventura-Dias, “the empirical research 
surrounding gender and trade in Latin America has focused on the nature of job opportunities 
and income brought by trade expansion. A secondary focus has been on the impact of intra-
household allocation and distribution of resources.”37 Thus, early research did not focus on 
trade policy, but rather the effects that liberalization would have on societally entrenched 
                                                          
33
 (Galor and Weil, 1996) 
34
 (Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen, 2002) 
35
 (Rees and Riezman, 2012) 
36
 (Edwards and Edwards, 1994) 
37
 (Ventura-Diaz, 2010, VI) 
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patriarchal norms.
38
 Bussolo and de Hoyos explain that only recently have efforts been made 
to study gender and free trade using classic economic theories. Social issues such as class, 
race, ethnicity, rural-urban status and social norms; and economic issues like conservative 
fiscal policies, tight monetary policy, deregulation of markets, public asset privatization, and 
anti-inflationary policies can also affect female resource endowments on an individual level. 
It is therefore difficult to delineate the social and economic effects from those derived from 
free trade.
39, 40
  
The degree of uncertainty associated with the overall impact of trade liberalization on 
women catalyzes considerable debate amongst scholars. Jones and Baker are among the 
scholars that find positive outcomes for women after liberalization. They argue that 
liberalization, as well as better access to education and economic adjustments have facilitated 
an increase in women’s share of employment in the public sector (specifically in Latin 
America.)
41
 Additionally, after a period of about two years after liberalization, Gaddis and 
Pieters find increasing rates of female labor force participation rates in Brazil.
42
 They explain 
that increased economic activity for women is due to both push and pull factors. Push factors 
include increased labor market insecurity and increased male unemployment (since women 
can provide extra income to the household in uncertain times); and pull factors include flows 
of employment across sectors which provide women with new opportunities to join new 
sectors.
43
  
Other studies have tested whether the Becker model of discrimination, which predicts that 
the increase in competition due to liberalization forces employers to decrease discrimination 
                                                          
38
 (Elson and Pearson, 1989, 1) 
39
 (Bussolo and de Hoyos, 2009) 
40
 (Ventura-Diaz, 2010, 14) 
41
 (Jones and Baker, 2008) 
42
 (Gaddis and Pieters, 2012, 1) 
43
 (Ibid., 2) 
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in hiring, holds true for gender discrimination. Black and Brainerd found that, between 1976 
and 1993, women employed in industrial sectors did indeed benefit from decreased hiring 
discrimination associated with increased competition.
44
 Tejani and Milberg found that 
liberalization could not erase all gender stereotypes against women that create obstacles to 
employment. These gender stereotypes lead to gender segmentation of industries and 
contribute to decreased intensity of female labor force participation, even when the gender 
wage gap and educational attainment are held constant, indicating a need for policy 
intervention.
45
 
While some studies find concrete evidence in one direction, most liberalization studies 
find heterogeneous effects of trade on women. For example, Klugman and Gameroni state 
that “trade liberalization has heightened women’s autonomy and resulted in benefits for 
future generations through investment in human capital”, yet go on to point out that women 
are somewhat prevented from taking full advantage of gains from trade.
46
 Even though the 
education gap has largely closed (especially in Latin America), differences in human capital 
persist due to women and men choosing different fields of study and because of cultural 
norms which largely force women to prioritize domestic responsibilities over formal 
employment.
47
 Paul-Majumder and Begum confirm that women in the garment industry in 
Bangladesh tend to have higher self-esteem and marry at a later age than their peers in the 
non-export sector. They also found that the Bangladeshi garment export industry had 
increased female participation in the labor force, female social prestige and female control of 
household decision-making and income. At the same time, the study also found a gender-
discriminated gap in wage rates, and that the garment industry was highly segregated in 
production by gender. They recommended policy changes be enacted to combat these 
                                                          
44
 (Black and Brainerd, 2004) 
45
 (Tejani and Milberg, 2010) 
46
 (Klugman and Gamberoni, 2012) 
47
 (Ibid.) 
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entrenched gaps since market forces alone have proved insufficient .
48
 The World Bank 
Development Report 2012 shows that, for many women, liberalization has created more jobs 
and stronger connections to markets. The same report finds that, due to weaker property 
rights and less access to productive inputs, women are less able to reap the benefits of trade 
liberalization in export sectors of natural resources and agriculture.
49
 Data collected by this 
author supports this claim, and will be examined further in the Discussion section.  
Research on trade and gender is often divided into four categories: 
1. The size and characteristic of female employment generated by non-traditional trade 
in the agro-export industries 
2. The impact of trade liberalization on female participation in urban labor markets 
3. The impact of trade liberalization on the informal urban economy 
4. The impact of the liberal agenda on female smallholder or peasant production, 
associated with an increased s hare of female-headed rural households
50
 
While this paper will eventually focus primarily on the first and second group, it is important 
to gain an understanding of how the existing research has framed the effects of trade in each 
sector of the economy.  
Non-traditional agricultural exports 
Women are often demanded as laborers in the high-value agricultural and 
manufacturing industry for a number of reasons broadly referred to as the ‘feminization of 
exporting jobs’ or the ‘feminization of labor conditions’.51 First, women are more likely to 
accept the often deplorable conditions of export processing operations which include a lack 
of job security and benefits, and lower pay. These types of labor-intensive industries seek 
skills that are often attributed, through social construction, to women generally, such as 
“obedience, manual dexterity, patience, the acceptance of hierarchy, and a lack of [labor] 
                                                          
48
 (Paul-Majumder and Begum, 2000) 
49
 (World Bank, 2011) 
50
 (Ventura-Diaz, 2010, VII) 
51
 (Ibid.) 
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militancy.”52 The jobs created by liberalization, though, are likely better in some way or 
women would not have left their previous employment. Liberalization can also cause the 
‘masculinization’ of traditionally female-employing industries. For example, this happened 
with groundnuts in Zambia
53
 and rice in the Gambia
54
 as commercialization and profits for 
the crops rose, men took over traditionally female occupations. This phenomenon is known 
as the development ‘glass ceiling’ where “women are hired for unskilled ‘feminine’ jobs… 
and they are replaced by men when technological upgrading is introduced.”55  
The ILO World of Work Report finds that, in almost all countries and especially in 
manufacturing and agricultural industries, women are overrepresented as part-time or 
temporary laborers.
56
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development discussed 
this phenomenon and concluded that temporary work for female laborers could be a double-
edged sword. Temporary work can accommodate women’s reproductive and domestic duties, 
but it is also associated with job insecurity, lack of benefits and extra training, and lack of 
upward mobility, which keeps women in low-skilled, low-paid jobs. Ballara and Parada show 
in their research that the majority of women in agriculture still work on farms as unpaid 
family workers, so the expansion of employment opportunities in the agricultural market can 
create new economic opportunities particularly for women.
57
 The flower, fresh fruit and 
vegetable, and poultry industries tend to employ large numbers of women in Latin America, 
as documented in the work of Dolan and Sorby.
58
  
                                                          
52
 (Ibid.) 
53
 (Wold, 1997) 
54
 (von Braun et al. 1994) 
55
 (Ventura-Dias, 2010, VII) 
56
 (ILO, 2010, 46) 
57
 (Ballara and Parada, 2009) 
58
 (Dolan and Sorby, 2003) 
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 Overall, women stand to gain from expanded opportunities in the agricultural industry 
created by liberalization, but often the form or degree to which they can utilize these 
opportunities is limited by other factors.  
Formal urban labor markets  
Fontana shows how variables at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels ultimately impact 
women in the urban sector. At the macro-level, gender gaps in market participation will vary 
according to which sectors gain through trade: if more female-intensive sectors gain than 
lose, women benefit. At the meso-level of analysis, government revenue from tariffs may 
decrease, which could decrease public provisions for services that benefit women. This is not 
a factor for larger countries like the United States or Canada, but could play a role in smaller 
economies that may depend on tariffs for government revenue. At the micro-level, whether 
sources of independent income for women expand or contract alters the control women can 
exercise over household expenditures.
59
 
Formal urban labor markets can be divided into two general categories of employment, 
which are equally important: workers as entrepreneurs and workers as laborers. These 
markets are the portion of the economy most visibly confined by gender norms. For example, 
manufacturing jobs tend to be persistently and exclusively divided along gender lines.
60
 GTZ 
et al. confirm that in Latin America especially, women are concentrated in commerce, health 
and education sectors, though increasingly women are finding employment in export sectors 
as well.
61
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Women as Entrepreneurs  
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Latin America has high rates of 
female entrepreneurship and a higher ratio of female to male entrepreneurship compared to 
other regions. GTZ et al. explains how this could be the result of positive or negative factors. 
Strong promotional institutions could be at play, but it could also be caused by a lack of other 
salaried options for women and a need for extra household income.
62
 Indeed, most female-
owned firms in the region are considered ‘small-enterprises’.63 
Several studies have been undertaken to understand the obstacles that women 
entrepreneurs face. Smith et al. describes how women globally tend to have decreased access 
to information, business networks and government institutions created to support export-
orientated firms.
64
 Papyrikis et al. also explains that because women have decreased access 
and control over natural, physical, financial and human assets, women are less able to take 
advantage of advances in technology and new opportunities in the export market.
65
 Finally, 
Gine et al. show that microfinance products designed to target entrepreneurs in developing 
countries tend to be unintentionally biased in marketing towards men. The study further 
shows that disadvantaged people tend to take more psychological cues from marketing, and 
therefore may be more deterred by incidental biases, such as having only men (or women) on 
the cover of a brochure.
66
 
Many programs are in place to encourage entrepreneurship in the developing world, 
however the effects of entrepreneurial employment can be ambiguous for women: helping in 
some ways, but harmful in others.  
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Women as Laborers 
On the other side of urban sector employment is labor. Ventura-Dias shows how trade 
liberalization could affect female employment in urban labor markets at the macro-level in a 
simple example. Take two goods, clothing and steel, where clothing is labor-intensive and 
employs mostly women, while steel is mostly capital-intensive and typically employs men. 
Suppose that a free trade agreement passes where the country’s comparative advantage lies in 
steel. Clothing now becomes the import-competing good, causing jobs in clothing production 
to decrease and jobs in steel production to increase. Social norms will prevent the now 
unemployed women for applying or being considered for the newly created steel jobs, which 
are being created at a slower rate anyway because the steel industry is capital-intensive.
67
 In 
this example, gender decides who will benefit and who will not after liberalization. 
Saure and Zoabi also studied the effects of NAFTA on FLFP and came to surprising 
conclusions. First they assume that male and female labor are imperfect substitutes because 
men and women are equally endowed with ‘brain’ but men (and not women) are also 
endowed with ‘brawn’. Therefore women are typically employed in capital-intensive 
industries and men in labor-intensive industries. The second assumption is that because men 
do not face the trade-off between domestic labor and formal employment, men are always 
fully formally employed. With these two assumptions in mind, if a country opens up to trade 
and has a comparative advantage in the female-intensive industry, the result will be decreased 
female labor force participation. Men, seeking to maximize their own labor market returns, 
will effectively ‘crowd out’ women laborers. 68 The opposite is also true: if the liberalizing 
country has a comparative advantage in the male-intensive industry, female labor force 
participation will expand because men are already fully employed and new jobs are being 
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created in the expanded industry.
69
 However, Do et al. find empirical evidence that does not 
support Saure and Zoabi’s seemingly counter-intuitive conclusions. First, they find that in 
countries where women are empowered, female-labor intensive industries will expand 
relatively more than in countries where women are not empowered. They also find that 
countries which export more female labor intensive goods have lower gender gaps. They 
conclude that a reciprocal relationship exists between country-specific attitudes toward 
women and expanding female labor intensive industries after liberalization.
70
 It should be 
noted that Duflo adds that this cycle is too weak to be self-reinforcing or self-sustaining 
without complementary public policies committed to equality.
71
  
Social norms are also a driving factor creating friction in the labor market. In virtually 
every country women are typically clustered in particular occupations and sectors of the 
economy, which have generally changed very little over time.
72
 Elson and Pearson discuss 
how trade literature traditionally ignores these discriminatory social norms. Their 1989 study 
on the effects of trade liberalization on women in Asia was one of the first in this field: 
combining trade, labor and household economics. Building off of the first study, Pearson 
concluded that “empirical research indicates that trade related [urban sector] employment 
could open up opportunities for women by challenging patriarchal relations and increasing 
women’s income, while at the same time decomposing and recomposing the existing forms of 
gender subordination.”73 GTZ et al. confirms that traditional household roles and cultural 
norms account for some of the increased unemployment rates amongst women, compared to 
their male counterparts.
74
 Indeed the World Development Report found that in Korea, 
women’s share of employment in manufacturing grew from 6% in 1970 to 30% by the early 
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1990s
75
; but a study by Seguino found that during this same period the female-male wage gap 
narrowed only marginally, despite favorable market conditions which would have predicted 
an increase in female wages relative to men’s. She found significant evidence that linked the 
growth of the Korean export markets with gender wage inequality. The causal link appears to 
be in hiring, training and promotion policies at the state and firm level. These policies leave 
women with relatively weaker fallback options for employment, which ultimately limits their 
ability to bargain for higher wages as productivity increases.
76
 
Another issue with urban sector employment created by liberalization is the unequal 
working conditions that often characterize female-intensive manufacturing industries (as well 
male-intensive, child-intensive, and other industries.) While research on this issue is divided, 
Azar maintains that trade liberalization has not improved the quality of female employment. 
Her research, based on case studies from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, 
concluded that women were more likely to lose their jobs than men after trade liberalization, 
and then were less likely to find new employment in trade-related industries afterward.
77
 Data 
collected by this author indicates that only Brazil, El Salvador, Paraguay and Venezuela 
experienced decreasing female labor force participation rates in the first year after 
liberalization; and only Argentina, Canada, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay and the U.S. 
experienced negative changes to female labor force participation from 2009 to 2012.  Studies 
have shown that employed women are subject to more job insecurity than men, so their 
employment status is much more volatile. A study by Levinshon showed that gross job 
reallocation rates in Chile after trade liberalization have been over twice as high for women 
compared to their male peers.
78,79 
Though Barrientos et al. finds that employment in these 
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industries is still a better alternative to unemployment or underemployment of rural family 
production.
80
 Another study by Heath and Mobarak confirms the potential long-term benefits 
of liberalization in a study which found that the probability that a five year-old girl in 
Bangladesh would attend school was increased by new employment opportunities in the 
garment industry.
81
 This point is contested by Papyrikis et al. who find that often the oldest 
female child becomes responsible for domestic tasks when the mother enters formal 
employment, often at the expense of the daughter’s education.82 The impact of the mother’s 
employment can be softened by reliable and affordable government childcare and eldercare 
programs, as explained by Gibb.
83
 
Interestingly, when Pearson published her study in 1998, Latin American women in 
the formal urban economy generally were not seeing the benefits from liberalization to the 
degree that women in Asia were, for reasons not completely understood. Ventura-Dias 
explains that:  
It is the unique nature of the international integration of each country 
or its trade specialization that will determine the characteristics of the 
demand for female [labor]. The correlation of manufacturing exports 
and female employment was due to the massive integration of Asian 
and a few other developing countries in international supply chains, 
with women performing the most [labor] intensive activities of these 
countries’ production (mostly in textiles and clothing, toys, and 
electronic products)… Latin American exporting industries are not 
intensive employers of women, although women have also been 
intensively employed in the non-traditional agricultural exports of 
countries such as Chile, Ecuador and Colombia.
84
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Essentially, Ventura-Diaz maintains that, due to country specific factors, Asian women have 
generally benefitted from trade liberalization, while Latin American women generally have 
not. Tejani and Milberg offered an explanation to this phenomenon in 2010 when they found 
that the manufacturing sector in Southeast Asia is now changing and undergoing 
defeminization, while in Latin America the labor force is seeing ongoing feminization. They 
argue that this is due to shifts in capital intensity and manufacturing productivity that occur 
when countries successfully upgrade industries from low-skill intensive manufacturing to 
high technology production.
85
  
Informal urban economy 
 The informal economy is defined as that which meets basic human needs, but is not 
paid, reported or subjection to taxation. It is sometimes referred to as ‘unpaid care work’, 
‘non-market work’ or ‘the work of social reproduction’ and can include child or family care, 
preparing meals, maintaining the household, community work, or any other labor that is not 
subject to taxation.
86
 Gibb explains that because the informal economy is outside of the realm 
of legal and regulatory institutions, this type of employment is often associated with high 
vulnerability and very little social security, and it tends to expand during times of economic 
adjustment (for example during the ‘Lost Decade’ in the 1980s.)87  
Work in the informal sector is rigidly divided along gender lines and proscribed by 
social norms. The same social norms also affect a person’s economic opportunities, including 
access to productive assets and benefits, and they often limit women’s mobility and decisions 
or choices.  
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Female heads of rural households and small peasant 
production 
 Trade liberalization is often associated with the destruction of small-scale production 
operations, which, as many studies show, can actually be beneficial to women. As mentioned 
earlier, Ballara and Parada show that most women in agriculture work on family farms as 
unpaid workers. Barrientos et al. agree that the high value agricultural export industries are 
typically a better alternative, in terms of quality of life measurements, than the rural family 
production.
88
 Weaker land property rights and access to productive inputs for women can 
limit the degree to which women can operate in the small-scale agriculture sector. For 
example, data from the Central Highlands of Guatemala shows that women hold less than 
five percent of contracts to produce two of the region’s most important crops: snow peas and 
broccoli.
89
 In a study on the effects of NAFTA, White et al. found that 56% of female-owned 
farms were on parcels of land smaller than two hectares (compared to 35% for men.) With 
the implementation of NAFTA, these small-scale operations did not have the means or the 
excess supply to engage in international trade, although they still faced competition from the 
heavily subsidized farmers in the U.S.
90
 Therefore, female farm-owners were displaced from 
their traditional agriculture occupations at a higher rate than their male counterparts.  
 In many ways, several areas of gender and trade studies are still very limited. It is this 
paper’s intention to stray from the traditional country and regional level of analysis, and 
instead examine how international institutions, i.e. (sub)regional trade agreements, can 
impact female employment: either by the nature of the agreement itself, or because of the 
implementation of specific policy measures, focusing specifically on institutions in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
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Hypothesis 
The goal of this paper is to examine a number of different variables to determine the 
mechanism (or mechanisms) by which women gain or lose from freer trade. Specifically 
asking, how have the major trading blocs in the Western Hemisphere promoted or 
discouraged women’s equality and participation in the economy?  
 It is already known that domestic policies can help alleviate the adjustment costs of 
trade liberalization. A study by Bardham shows that proper domestic policies can work to 
compensate industries that are negatively affected by liberalization, facilitate displaced 
workers training programs, or enhance the operation of certain markets.
91
 Klugman and 
Gamberoni agree, stating that “globalization alone cannot eliminate gender gaps; 
complementary policies and public action are also needed to reduce disparities in education 
and skill level as well as increase women’s access to capital.”92 Here, I seek to determine if 
policies beyond the domestic level, at the RTA level, can also have an impact on domestic 
gender issues. 
The Global Gender Gap Report, which includes an overall gender gap score, the 
economic gender gap score and a political gap score, will serve as dependent variables. Other 
dependent variables from the three categories of health, political representation, and 
economic equality include adolescent fertility rate, wage equality and income equality scores 
(both from the Global Gender Gap Report), female labor force participation and female 
participation as a percentage of total labor force participation, social norms (operationalized 
by the presence of sexual harassment laws in the work place.), changes in GDP per capita, 
and female representation in Parliament or an equivalent body. This study does not include 
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educational attainment gaps or health gaps because gender-differences in education and 
access to healthcare have been largely eliminated in the Western Hemisphere.  
Independent variables include membership to each trading bloc; change in GDP over 
time; relative endowments of land, labor, capital and technology; agricultural/food exports as 
a percentage of merchandise exports; and social norms (again, operationalized by the 
presence of sexual harassment laws in the work place.) 
 Aspects of each bloc’s preambles were also included as independent variables. Many 
ideas are reiterated throughout multiple agreements, as shown in Table 2 
Table 1. Priorities specifically named in the preambles of the six major trading blocs in the 
Western Hemisphere. Compiled by author. 
 Labor 
Rights 
Environment Improve 
development 
indicators 
IPR Subsidies/ 
protectionism  
Integration Other 
NAFTA X X  X X   
Mercosur  X    Latin 
America 
 
CAFTA-
DR 
X X  X  Western 
hemisphere, 
specifically 
FTAA 
Eliminate 
bribery and 
corruption in 
int’l trade & 
development 
ALBA  X Decrease 
illiteracy 
  Latin 
America 
Technology 
exchange, 
protect cultures 
CARICOM       Establish and 
maintain stable 
macroeconomic 
environment & 
diversify 
agriculture 
Andean 
Community 
     Andean 
subregional 
community 
Equality, 
peace, 
democracy 
 
Though none specifically mention a commitment to promoting women’s rights, aspects like 
reinforcing labor rights and improving development indicators were tested as independent 
variables in place of testing each agreement separately. 
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 The scope of the research is limited to NAFTA, Mercosur, CAN, CAFTA-DR, 
Caricom, and ALBA. These are the major trading blocs in the Western hemisphere, excluding 
the Pacific Alliance which is too new to study the medium- and long-term impacts of 
liberalization. NAFTA and Mercosur are the two largest blocs in the Western Hemisphere, 
and in fact, two of the largest blocs in the world. The countries of CAN represent an 
interesting mix of development levels, and have created several policies to make 
liberalization easier for the less developed countries like Peru. CAFTA-DR and Caricom both 
boast large membership of Central American countries, but are also very different in 
important ways. The member countries of CAFTA-DR have very different levels of 
development, and the agreement itself does not extend much beyond the realm of trade. The 
members of Caricom, on the other hand, are much more similar in terms of development and 
the agreement also created institutions that are beyond the realm of trade. Finally, ALBA is 
critical to include because it represents an entirely different model of free trade based on 
mutually beneficial exchanges, and is purposely anti-capitalist in many respects. It will be 
particularly interesting to see if any of the policies that ALBA touts are indeed improving the 
economic opportunities for its female population.  
 Based on the above knowledge, I hypothesize (H1) that agreements which are more 
intense in terms of going beyond a basic trade agreement, such as CARICOM, as well as 
agreements which are sensitive to the development needs of member countries, such as CAN 
and ALBA, will be more effective at addressing the issues and obstacles of women citizens of 
the bloc. Further, I hypothesize (H2) that it will take several years for the effects of 
liberalization to become noticeable in the data set. Therefore, I predict that female labor force 
participation rate changes over 5 years will have little significance, but changes over 8 years 
will be more likely to produce significance. Finally, I hypothesize (H3) that cultural norms 
(the presence of sexual harassment laws) will affect several economic factors including the 
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Global Gender Gap Report’s economic inequality, income inequality and wage inequality 
scores, the change in female labor force participation from 2009 to 2012 and the total current 
female labor force participation rate. 
Cases 
 In order to fully understand how each trade bloc in this study has affected female 
access to the labor force, it is important to have a basic understanding of each agreement. 
This section will briefly summarize each trading bloc, including the current research on the 
effect on women that reside within the bloc since liberalization. 
Synopsis of the major RTAs in the Western Hemisphere 
Mercosur 
In 1986, Brazil and Argentina signed the Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economic 
Cooperation Program (PICE) which was designed to begin reducing tariffs on various 
products bilaterally. In 1991, with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion, the agreement 
expanded to Uruguay and Paraguay, and Mercosur was born. A few days after the first 
Summit of the Americas, the countries of Mercosur signed the Treaty of Ouro Preto which 
established an institutional basis for the Mercosur agreement. One year later, on January 1
st
, 
1995, Mercosur expanded from a trade agreement to a customs union by establishing an 
(imperfect) common external tariff (CET). Although Mercosur is not without problems, from 
1986 to 1995 Argentina’s trade with Mercosur members grew from 8% to 25%, Brazil’s trade 
grew from 5% to 14%, and the smaller countries, Paraguay and Uruguay, were trading almost 
50% of their imports and exports within Mercosur.
93
 By 1995, the common external tariff 
covered 85% of bloc-traded goods.  
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Currently, Mercosur is weakened by infrastructure bottlenecks and extensive customs 
bureaucracy, though the biggest weakness is a noticeable lack of overarching institutions. The 
EU has a complex supranational governing structure and NAFTA has one country (the U.S.) 
with the financial resources to bail out others in times of emergency, yet Mercosur does not 
have any institution or player that can fill this role.
94
 This problem became glaringly apparent 
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. A few months after the second Summit of the Americas 
in 1998, Brazil was forced to abruptly devalue its currency. Brazil managed to save its own 
economy, but the devaluation led Argentina to struggle with balance of payments problems. 
Eventually, Argentina was forced to unpeg its currency from the U.S. dollar, causing an 
economic crisis that spilled over into a social and political crisis in 2002. Although the costs 
of dropping out of Mercosur were too high, given the political capital and expenditures that 
went into creating it, Argentina did put up protectionist measures against Brazil, even though 
this was against Mercosur law. Argentina’s economy and Mercosur were saved only when 
Brazil finally agreed to give aid money to Argentina.  
Since its beginning there has been an inherent tension between the two models of a 
union that Mercosur has pursued: one of development and the other of regional integration. 
Since “the early 2000s, the disillusionment with neoliberal reforms and the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ has strengthened the second model [of regional integration] and coincided with a 
reorientation of Argentina and Brazil’s foreign economic policy, taking distance from the 
United States.”95 In the 1990’s, Mercosur became almost a symbol of an alternative power 
structure in the Western Hemisphere. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as Brazil’s Foreign 
Minister called Mercosur a “South American platform”, and later, as President of Brazil, 
called it “a pole from which we [the member countries of Mercosur] will organize the South 
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American space.”96 In 2005, Mercosur and CAN expanded South American unity by 
negotiating a partnership whereby the members of each would serve as associate members of 
the other. Associate members have privileges which vary by agreement, but typically include 
extending a free trade agreement and/or limited voting rights at trade summits. In the case of 
Mercosur and CAN, they are also aiming to increase political dialogue, deepen their 
knowledge of each other, intensify political coordination and move toward more South 
American unity: potentially even unifying the two agreements in the future.  
Venezuela was admitted to Mercosur in 2012. Paraguay had been in staunch 
opposition to accepting Venezuela’s bid to join Mercosur, but critics from Venezuela and 
within Mercosur argued that the oppositionists from Paraguay were backed by the United 
States. Therefore, in 2012, the other countries of Mercosur jumped at the opportunity to 
suspend Paraguay when President Fernando Lugo was impeached, in what many regional 
leaders called a parliamentary coup. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina 
said Paraguay would be suspended “until a democratic process allows for popular sovereignty 
to be restored.”97 In the same breath, the leaders of Mercosur announced that Venezuela 
would become a full member of Mercosur. As of 2013, Paraguay has been reinstated to its 
full membership status.
98
 
Mercosur and Women 
While there are examples of groups at the national level dedicated to promoting 
women’s rights in free trade, Jelin et al. write that “the Mercosur process [has failed to] 
encourage the creation of a women’s movement that is regional in nature.”99 Beatriz 
Etchechury Mazza from Uruguay’s Ministry of Education and Culture agrees with Jelin et al., 
saying that “women in the Mercosur countries are decades behind their European 
                                                          
96
 (Cardoso, 1998, 127) 
97
 (“Mercosur suspends Paraguay”, 2012) 
98
 (Ibid.) 
99
 (Jelin et al., 1998) 
32 
 
counterparts… It will take time and a lot of work for us to become strong players in our 
societies. Perhaps then we will be able to make a difference in the Mercosur area.”100  
The Mercosur Women’s Forum was created in 1995. “The primary objective of the 
Forum was to create conditions whereby women may contribute effectively to advance the 
integration process through their experiences, the vision on general problems and on issues 
that affect women.”101 The group also works closely with national trade unions and workers’ 
unions and has an office in each of the four countries of Mercosur (with the exception of 
Venezuela since it just joined); however in practice it has had very little impact on regional 
law.
102
 
The Special Committee on Women (REM) was created by the Common Market 
Group through Resolution 20/98. The Committee acts as a voice for the Women’s Forum and 
other associations that focus on issues pertaining to women. It was granted permanent 
placement in the consultative body, the Economic and Social Forum, where it can offer a 
gendered perspective to laws that affect women.
103,104
 A recent example of work done by the 
Committee was to hold the Specialized Women’s Conference in 2003 in which all members 
and associate members (Chile and Bolivia) sent delegates to discuss the problem of 
trafficking of women and girls within the bloc.
105
  In 1998, member states committed their 
general support for workplace equality and equal treatment in the Social and Labor 
Declaration of Mercosur. However, no concrete plan was formalized until Resolution 84/00 
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was passed in 2005, asking working forums and groups within Mercosur to incorporate a 
gendered perspective into their deliberations.
106
  
Unionism has been one of the most prevalent social actors in Mercosur.
107
 The 
CCSCS-MERCOSUR Women’s Commission was created in 1997 and charged with several 
goals, including:  
to encourage the active participation of female workers in Mercosur, send up-
to-date information to all unions and women’s departments and secretariats, 
nationally,… formulate affirmative action policies for women in the region 
along the lines of [the] commitment to the Beijing Action Platform, adopt the 
necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, 
and ratify the International Labor Organization agreements.
108
 
One marked achievement for unionized women is the Social and Employment 
Declaration, which guaranteed equal rights and working conditions to all laborers in 
the four member states. 
NAFTA 
 In the late 1980’s, President Carlos Salinas of Mexico approached U.S. President 
Bush Sr. about signing a free trade agreement similar to the agreement that the U.S. had just 
signed with Canada in 1987. On January 1, 1994, after much negotiation, NAFTA went into 
effect under President Clinton. Later that year, at the first Summit of the Americas, the three 
presidents of NAFTA agreed to admit Chile into the agreement as well. Unfortunately, 
Clinton no longer had the authority to sign trade agreements.
109
 Because the U.S. constitution 
grants Congress the power to regulate trade, Congress had to grant the president ‘fast-track 
authority’ to autonomously negotiate the specific points of the agreement, and then Congress 
could either accept it in full or reject it.
110
 Less than a year after the passage of NAFTA, and 
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only a few days after the first Summit of the Americas, Mexico experienced a sudden 
devaluation of the peso. The crisis resulted in a massive IMF bailout consisting of an aid 
package of $50 billion, two-thirds of which was funded by the United States in an effort to 
save the economy of its newest trading partner.
111
 By 1996, the Mexican economy had fully 
recovered, but the crisis left a bad taste in the mouth of U.S. policymakers. This event 
certainly contributed to Clinton’s inability to secure fast-track authority to sign Chile onto 
NAFTA. Meanwhile, Chile had changed courses and signed bilateral free trade agreements 
with Canada and Mexico and became an associate member of Mercosur in 1996.
112
 Argentina 
also considered entering NAFTA in the early 2000’s, but U.S. sentiment in the country turned 
sour after the U.S. did not provide aid to Argentina during its 2002 crisis, even though 
Argentina been a close U.S. ally throughout the 1990s.
113 
NAFTA is different from Mercosur and most of the other agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere in two important ways. First, NAFTA applies to all member countries equally: it 
does not formally take into account or provide preferential treatment based on differences in 
levels of development or wealth. Second, it only applies to the movement and transfer of 
goods, services, investments and intellectual property rights, not people. Not allowing for the 
free movement of people is unique to NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, the other four agreements in 
this study allow for some degree of free movement of people. In this sense, NAFTA is strictly 
limited to a free trade area and could be considered more minimalist or less intrusive than the 
other agreements. 
Although NAFTA continues to be contentious, it has widely been considered a 
success because of the “creation of six million jobs in the United States [that are] tied to 
NAFTA policies, more than $500 billion in goods and services traded between the United 
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States and Mexico, and the ports of Laredo and El Paso [Texas] being among the United 
States’ busiest [even though they are landlocked.]”114 By 2001, the Western Hemisphere was 
buying 45% of U.S. exports and providing 36% of U.S. imports, 4/5 of which was with 
Canada and Mexico.
115
 By 2010, “the United States had $918 billion in two-way trade with 
Canada and Mexico, according to the office of Ron Kirk, [the] United States Trade 
Representative.”116 
NAFTA and Women 
In conjunction with signing NAFTA, the three countries also agreed to the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The preamble of the text explains 
the mission of the agreement which was to:  
create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in 
their territories, enhance the competitiveness of their firms in global markets, 
create new employment opportunities and improve working conditions and 
living standards in their respective territories, and protect, enhance and 
enforce basic workers’ rights.117  
Gender equality and non-discrimination in the work place are mentioned in part three article 
eleven and annex one section eight, which both state that all parties should be committed to 
equal pay for equal work for men and women. The text unfortunately never elaborates or 
creates a plan for action and is often criticized for not prioritizing gender issues. Concha et 
al. explains that the secondary status of gender-specific labor laws means that if female 
workers’ rights are violated, signatory countries do not have the power to withdraw trade 
benefits, convene a panel, or even seek legal redress at the highest levels of corporate 
management if the company or owner is foreign. Several cases of well-documented sexual 
harassment and gender discrimination (like forced pregnancy testing) at export-processing 
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centers in Mexico have shown that this oversight has been detrimental to Mexican 
women.
118
  
NAFTA has only had one group of note that was dedicated to women’s issues at the 
institutional level: Mujer a Mujer (Woman to Woman). This group organized the 1992 Tri-
national Working Women’s Conference on Free Trade and Continental Integration during 
the negotiations for NAFTA, but then disappeared a few years later due to lack of funding. 
Other activist groups exist at the national level, but NAFTA does not currently have an 
institutional level group dedicated to women’s issues.119 
Aguayo-Tellez et al. found ambiguous effects of NAFTA liberalization (and the 
subsequent increase in foreign direct investment.) They found that relative wages for 
Mexican women increased, and that both within industry and intra-industry shifts favored 
female workers, including increased hiring of skilled blue-collar women.
120
 There was also 
evidence of shifted household bargaining power indicated by a shift in expenditures from 
‘male’ goods like men’s clothing, alcohol and tobacco, to ‘female’ goods including 
women’s clothing and education. However, the study also revealed that the increased 
technology associated with liberalization raised women’s relative productivity in blue-
collared jobs, but white-collared productivity stayed the same. Empirical evidence therefore 
only supported increased hiring and increased wages in blue-collar, not white-collar jobs.
121
  
Cardero found that the corn and bean industry liberalizations that occurred under NAFTA 
combined with decreased price supports from the Mexican government for domestic 
farmers and consumers led to wide-spread job loss for peasant farmers.
122
 The displacement 
of peasant farmers can be viewed as a good thing from an economic perspective because 
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less efficient producers will eventually transfer to sectors where they can be more efficient. 
However, from a social perspective, the loss of rural production opportunities can in some 
cases lead to the destruction or impoverishment of indigenous cultures.
123
 In reality, White 
et al. claim that, between 1994 (when NAFTA was implemented) and 2003 (when their 
study was published), “the number of female-headed households living in poverty in 
Mexico increased by 50 percent. While the jobs created by NAFTA primarily went to 
women, they [were] low-waged and insecure jobs in, for example, the border export 
factories (maquilas). While offering women some autonomy they do not alleviate 
poverty.”124 The job loss also increased the instances of temporary labor migration 
(including undocumented labor migration, mostly to the U.S.), and also the level of female-
headed households and female migrant workers.
125,126
 
Community of Andean Nations (CAN) 
 The idea of an Andean Community began in 1969 with the signing of the Cartagena 
Agreement which created the Andean Pact. In 1996, the Andean leaders committed to 
reviving the regional integration scheme. They amended the Cartagena Agreement with the 
Protocol of Trujillio and changed the group’s name to the Community of Andean Nations 
(CAN). Chile was originally a founding member, but withdrew in 1976 and is now an 
associate member. Venezuela was also a member from 1973-2006, withdrawing to accept 
membership into Mercosur over disputes about bilateral agreements between Peru and 
Colombia with the United States.  
 CAN has continued to consolidate since its reawakening in the 90s. Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela began issuing Andean Passports in 2001 and Bolivia and Colombia have since 
joined them. In 2004, the member countries also approved a common external tariff; and in 
                                                          
123
 (White, Salas, Gammage, 2003) 
124
 (Ibid.) 
125
 (Cardero, 2000) 
126
 (White, Salas, Gammage, 2003) 
38 
 
2005, citizens of CAN were granted increased freedom of mobility when they were no longer 
required to have a visa or passport (just a national ID) to travel within CAN member 
countries.  
CAN and Women 
 In 2009, representatives from each of the CAN member countries met to create the 
Andean Advisory Council of High-Level Authorities on Women and Equal Opportunity 
(CAAAMI). The Council is made up of ministerial ranking officials from each country plus 
Chile. The Council serves as an advisory body to “support subregional integration in the area 
of human rights, gender and [intercultural awareness]… with a view to furthering equal 
opportunities among men and women, eliminating violence [against] women and building a 
new society that is more just and equitable.
127
 
ALBA-TCP 
In 2001, Cuba and Venezuela began discussing the possibility of a regional trading 
bloc that could be an alternative to the U.S.-backed FTAA. In 2004, that possibility was 
realized when the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas Trade Treaty for the People (ALBA-
TCP) was officially enacted. The world ‘alba’ in Spanish literally means ‘dawn’, but the 
name also invokes Hugo Chavez’s dream of a ‘Bolivarian revolution’ which refers to Simon 
Bolivar, an historical figure that liberated many Latin American countries from Spain, and 
has become a modern day symbol against U.S. influence in the region. ALBA is associated 
with the socialist and social-democratic countries of Latin America and has provided support 
for emerging leftist regimes around the region. 
Since 2004, seven more countries have joined ALBA, all of which (at least in theory) 
are required to maintain domestic participatory democracies: Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua 
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(2008), Dominica (2008), Honduras (2008-2010), Ecuador (2009), St. Vincent and the 
Grenadine Islands (2009), and Antigua and Barbuda (2009).
128
  
Upon its signing, ALBA was designed to be more than a trade agreement: branching 
into other realms of international finance, becoming a political alliance and creating a 
platform for the expression of the agendas of regional social movements. It is made up of 
three councils: the presidential, the ministerial, and the third is reserved for leaders of 
international social movements (such as the Via Campesina: an international peasant 
movement, and the Movimiento Sin Tierra: the Landless Workers’ Movement.) The goal of 
ALBA is to form an international alliance based on promoting equality domestically and 
between trading partners, as well as supporting social movements and the environment, and 
reducing Latin American reliance on foreign powers (especially the U.S.). 
In terms of finance, ALBA member states are working to institute a formal hard 
currency, the “sucre” (the Unitary System of Regional Compensation), which is named after 
another independence hero and friend of Bolivar, Antonio Jose de Sucre. The sucre is already 
used as the currency for ALBA trading deals.
 129
 Aside from the sucre, the ALBA countries 
have also established the Bank of the ALBA which is meant to act as an alternative to the 
IMF. The Bank of the ALBA does not impose loan conditions and was created with the 
explicit mission of “seeking to eradicate economic asymmetries” across the trading bloc.130 
As of 2008, the Bank of the ALBA had over $1 billion USD, and had set aside money 
specifically for programs to improve public schools, healthcare and other social services to 
member states.
131
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ALBA also creates a space for dialogue to enact trade agreements that focus more on 
creating creative economic policies that promote equality within and between member 
countries. For example, in 2004,  Cuba and Venezuela signed an agreement whereby Cuba 
receives 1 billion dollars’ worth of subsidized oil in exchange for supplying 30,000 Cuban 
doctors to work amongst those most needy or at-risk patients in Venezuela who would 
probably otherwise not have any access to healthcare.
132
 Venezuela has also given Cuba 
buses to aid in public transportation development, helped build an aqueduct and 
technologically renovate an oil refinery to improve Cuban water supply and increase Cuban 
exports of profitable oil derivatives.
133
 Venezuela has also helped build eight centers in 
Nicaragua to provide housing and education for the country’s 47,000 homeless children.134 
The goal of ALBA is to promote and facilitate creative trades like these amongst member 
countries.  
ALBA has also helped newly social-democratic or socialist countries if they are 
shunned by the United States or other trade partners. For example, in 2006 in response to the 
election of the socialist president, Evo Morales, the U.S. stopped buying Bolivian soy beans. 
In response, Cuba and Venezuela began importing Bolivian soy beans in order to help save 
the industry. Additionally, they helped Bolivia improve public schools and hospitals and 
helped upgrade Bolivia’s gas sector in order to help Bolivia become self-sufficient in its gas-
derived energy needs.
135
 
Social movements have also played a critical role in the development of ALBA. This 
is due to the institutional structure which provides several outlets for workers’, students’ and 
social movements. Because of the influence of social movements, five major agricultural 
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projects have been implemented in soy beans, rice, poultry and dairy products to help 
guarantee food security for all citizens in member states.
136
 Plans to build an oil pipeline from 
Venezuela to Argentina were put on hold due to concerns expressed by various social 
activists groups over environmental degradation and indigenous rights.
137
 Other ALBA 
policies have been influenced by various groups which has led to the creation of many 
policies regarding land redistribution, free health care, free education and food security.
138
  
ALBA and Women 
 In June, 2009 the member countries of ALBA issued a joint declaration at the VI 
Extraordinary Summit of ALBA. This declaration included the creation of the “Ministerial 
Council of Women” which was tasked with the purpose of “ensuring gender mainstreaming 
in all the integration initiatives and instruments that emanate from ALBA.”139 Unfortunately, 
very little research exists on ALBA, and even fewer studies focus exclusively on gender 
issues in the region. 
CAFTA-DR 
CAFTA-DR was signed in 2004 by seven member countries: Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the U.S. From 2005-2010, as 
part of the agreement, the U.S. government has given over $142 million in funds for ‘labor 
capacity building’ projects such as programs focused on strengthening labor ministries’ and 
courts’ capacity. The goal was to enforce labor laws in order to promote an overall culture of 
legal compliance, prevent child labor exploitation, and eliminate gender and other types of 
discrimination.
140
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CAFTA-DR and Women 
 One of the U.S.-sponsored programs that was implemented as part of the CAFTA-DR 
agreement that, in part, specifically benefits women was the Citizens’ Access to Labor Justice 
for CAFTA-DR. The U.S. pledged $1.3 million dollars in aid in the fiscal year of 2007-2008 
for the project that was designed to span from 2008-2010. The project goal was to “provide 
training and other support to civil society organizations that provide services (counseling, 
accessibility, translation for indigenous languages, etc.) to women and other disadvantaged 
groups to obtain access to labor justice.” In January 2008, 1,000 copies of “One Small Step 
Forward and A Long Way to Go” were distributed to increase awareness of gender-based 
work place discrimination, especially in export-processing zones.
141
 The project also included 
“conduct[ing] an audit of court processes that affect women, disabled persons, indigenous 
groups and other disadvantaged populations, and provided technical assistance to these 
courts, as well as sensitivity training for judges and public defenders.”142  
Caricom 
The Caribbean Community (Caricom) stems from what was originally called the West 
Indies Federation. The Federation formally ended in 1962 after lasting only four years, but in 
1965, the countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago 
met to create the CARIFTA (Caribbean Free Trade Association), which was soon replaced by 
Caricom in 1973 in order to enlarge the agreement to a common market. Caricom quickly 
expanded as other Caribbean nations joined, and in 1995 Suriname became the 14
th
 and most 
recent Caricom member. Caricom was brought into existence by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
which was revised in 2001.  
CARICOM and Women 
While the original Treaty of Chaguaramas does not mention female welfare, the 
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishes the Council for Human and Social Development 
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which is responsible for “establish[ing] policies and programs to promote the development of 
youth and women in the Community with a view to encouraging and enhancing their 
participation in the social, cultural and economic activities.”143 For example, CARICOM has 
set a target of 30% minimum level of women in decision-making positions in the public and 
private sectors in all member countries.
144
  
In 1980, two sections of the CARICOM Secretariat, the Women’s Affairs Division 
and the Legal Division, joined to undertake a research project that would examine the legal 
status of women within CARICOM. The project uncovered that legal protection for women 
were deficient in six key categories:  citizenship, domestic violence, equal pay, inheritance, 
sexual harassment and sexual offenses. Ultimately, these discoveries led to the publication of 
model legislation on issues affecting women that could be used by national governments to 
equalize protection of the law in member states. 
More recently, CARICOM has made several commitments to increasing the welfare 
of women in the Caribbean. For example, in 2010, the Secretariat General launched a 
campaign to work with the United Nation’s “UNiTE to End Violence Against Women” to 
create awareness and to educate the people of CARICOM countries about gender-based 
violence which is endemic in the Caribbean. Studies have shown that 25% of women from 
Guyana, 30% of women from Trinidad and Tobago and 67% of women in Suriname have 
been victims of domestic abuse.
145
 In order to combat the rising rate of abuse, fifteen 
Caribbean artists were trained and commissioned to create ‘edutainment’ material. In a recent 
speech at the 66
th
 Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Guyana’s Caricom representative 
spoke on behalf of Caricom to reaffirm Caricom’s commitment to gender equality, stating: 
“Mr. Chairman… Promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women is a central 
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priority for CARICOM States. We believe that women must become equal and full 
participants in all processes affecting their lives, if a society characterized by justice, peace 
and development is to be realized.”146  
In 2011, the CARICOM Secretariat conducted an assessment on the situation of 
Caribbean women, which found  a “linkage between gender inequalities and discrimination 
on the one hand, and factors such as economic vulnerability of female headed households, the 
gendered burden of care and the high levels of unemployment and under-employment among 
women on the other.”147 The report also projected that efforts to overcome these inequalities 
have been set back by current financial crisis because of “a shortage of resources to address 
the structural inequalities.”148 There has also been a general recognizing by CARICOM 
member states that sex trafficking of women and girls is becoming a growing issue for all 
member states.
149
 Unfortunately, scholarly articles on the effectiveness of these policies are 
noticeably lacking.  
Methodology, Findings, and Discussion 
 I used STATA software to run several linear regression analyses to determine whether 
RTAs in the Western Hemisphere have aided or detracted from female equality. Initially, I 
used variations of GDP, agricultural exports, technology, land and capital per worker and 
occasionally social norms as control variables. I then tested membership in each agreement 
on each dependent variable: female labor force participation rate, average fertility rates, the 
Global Gender Gap Report’s economic, political, wage and income inequality scores, and 
social norms. Due to lack of viable data, the data set was incomplete in many ways and it 
became clear that a high number of regressors would lead to the production of spurious 
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relationships. It was then decided that the GDP variable would serve as a sufficient proxy for 
the rest of the control variables in order to maximize sample size. Additionally, several 
dependent variables did not contain enough variance to produce significance. These variables 
included adolescent fertility rate and the Global Gender Gap scores, with the exception of 
wage inequality.  
Membership in an RTA had no significance on the remaining dependent variables: 
normalizing anti-discriminatory policies (sexual harassment laws), changes in wage 
inequality over time and changes in female labor force participation. Table 3 below shows the 
findings for each agreement’s effect on female labor force participation changes from 2009 to 
2012, holding GDP change as constant. Mercosur membership was associated with a slightly 
negative effect in FLFP, and the rest were insignificant. 
Table 3 Membership impact on FLFP, holding GDP change constant 
Agreement Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
Mercosur -.0356 .0149 .024 31 .1330 
NAFTA -.0045 .0190 .406 31 -.0415 
CAN -.0002 .0180 .989 31 -.0436 
ALBA .0021 .0143 .887 31 -.0429 
CAFTA -.0002 .0135 .987 31 -.0436 
CARICOM .0018 .0143 .903 31 -.0431 
None (GDP 
change) 
.0265 .0301 .387 31 -.0076 
 
Table 4 shows each agreement’s effect on member countries having domestic sexual 
harassment laws in the work place. Caricom is associated with a decreased likeliness and 
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GDP change is associated with an increased likeliness of having these laws in place, the rest 
were insignificant. The result for Caricom is surprising because of the organization’s high 
level of investment in fighting gender-based violence. Possible reasons for this, I predict, are 
either that their initiatives are not resonating with member countries or that not enough time 
has passed to begin to see results.   
Table 4 Membership impact on the presence of domestic sexual 
harassment laws in the work place, holding GDP Change 
Constant 
Agreement Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
Mercosur .2074 .4191 .376 34 .1328 
NAFTA .3747 .2624 .163 34 .1652 
CAN -.1603 .2556 .535 34 .1215 
ALBA -.1120 .1879 .556 34 .1204 
CAFTA .2528 .1847 .181 34 .1610 
CARICOM -.5762 .1725 .002 34 .3458 
None (GDP 
change) 
.9708 .3871 .017 34 .1381 
 
Table 5 shows that none of the agreements were effective at encouraging wage equality in 
member countries. GDP changes were also insignificant to explain changes in wage equality, 
indicating increases in GDP continue to be distributed unevenly. 
 
 
Table 5 Membership impact on wage equality change from 2009-2012, 
holding GDP Change Constant 
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Agreement Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
Mercosur .0614 .0452 .188 25 -.0035 
NAFTA .0094 .0563 .869 25 -.0864 
CAN .0400 .0511 .441 25 -.0582 
ALBA .0743 .0466 .125 25 .1062 
CAFTA -.0450 .288 .288 25 -.1309 
CARICOM -.0153 .0482 .753 25 -.0828 
None (GDP 
change) 
-.0265 .1026 .798 25 -.0405 
 
Since there was very little and sometimes negative relationships between RTA membership 
and the dependent variables I tested, I’ve concluded that my H1 hypothesis was incorrect. 
Despite the rhetoric and the various policies and institutions, none of the trade agreements 
have been effective at encouraging women’s equal participation in domestic economies.  
To test my H2 that it would take time for trade agreements to have a noticeable effect 
on female labor force participation, I used FLFP data for one, five and eight years after the 
agreement was signed. Eight years was used instead of ten to decrease the number of missing 
values. Given that trade agreements have proven to be ineffective at affecting FLFP, it is not 
surprising that this result proves to be inconclusive. CAN was the only agreement that 
showed any significance, but it did not follow the expected pattern: it affected FLFP at both 
the 5 year and 8 year change. Mechanistically, this could be due to outside economic factors 
that were occurring at the time of ratification or due to the increased economic activity 
associated with the formation of CAN. 
Table 6 Membership impact on 5 and 8 year changes in female labor 
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force participation, holding GDP change constant 
Agreement Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
Mercosur 5 year change 
8 year change 
-.0652 
-.1183 
.0336 
.0636 
.067 
.078 
23 
22 
.1142 
.1375 
NAFTA 5 year change 
8 year change 
-.0227 
-.0374 
.0438 
.0809 
.611 
.650 
23 
22 
-.0382 
-.0083 
CAN 5 year change 
8 year change 
.0839 
.2497 
.0357 
.0586 
.029 
.000 
23 
22 
.1759 
.5279 
ALBA 5 year change 
8 year change 
.0395 
.0783 
.0351 
.0644 
.274 
.239 
23 
22 
.0106 
.0539 
CAFTA 5 year change 
8 year change 
-.0154 
-.0525 
.0345 
.0629 
.660 
.414 
23 
22 
-.0417 
.0165 
CARICOM 5 year 
change 
8 year change 
.0196 
.0231 
.0523 
.0967 
.711 
.814 
23 
22 
-.0447 
-.0166 
None (GDP change) 
5 year change 
8 year change) 
 
.0863 
.2173 
 
.0882 
.1677 
 
.339 
.210 
 
23 
22 
 
-.0020 
.0313 
 
 Interestingly, H3 was also incorrect. Sexual harassment laws had no correlation to 
increased wage equality or female labor force participation. Apparently, sexual harassment 
laws are not indicative of greater, economy-wide equality shifts in the relative worth of 
women’s labor, as shown in Table 7. This is, of course, not to say that sexual harassment 
laws do not have merit outside of these findings.  
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Table 7 Sexual harassment laws’ impact on wage equality change from 
2009-2013 
Variables Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
harassment laws -.0334 .0405 .418 25 -.0135 
harassment laws, 
holding GDP change 
constant 
-.0337 .0441 .452 25 -.0596 
 
These laws also did not affect the rate at which women chose to enter the work force. Table 8 
shows female labor force participation changes from 2009 to 2012 were unaffected by sexual 
harassment laws, even when holding constant for changes in GDP over the same time period. 
Table 8 Sexual harassment laws’ impact on female labor force 
participation change from 2009-2012 
Variables Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
harassment laws .0059 .0127 .647 31 -.0269 
harassment laws, 
holding GDP change 
constant 
.0245 .0317 .448 31 -.0415 
 
Most countries without some form of sexual harassment protection in the work place are 
poorer, less developed countries. These countries are still engaging in production that is 
highly segregated, so perhaps sexual harassment laws are irrelevant if women are not coming 
into contact with abusive men during the workday. Another factor could be that economic 
desperation prevents women from having a true choice of whether or not to withdraw from 
the labor force. 
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 Outside of my original hypothesis, I also found, in Table 9, that high levels of 
hectares of land per person were negatively correlated with female labor force participation 
changes. This result is not surprising and it is consistent with the findings of Ballara and 
Parada that the majority of women in agriculture are unpaid workers on family farms.
150
 
More available land per person only increases the chance that women will have to work on 
family farms. 
Table 9 The impact of hectares of land per person on female labor force 
participation change from 2009-2012 
Variables Coefficient St. Error P-value N Adj. R-
squared 
Hectares of land per 
person (as of 2011), 
holding GDP change 
constant 
-.0483 .0194 .019 31 .1463 
 
Regional trade agreements could be doing more to promote gender equality within 
their regions. Espino discusses the importance of “capitaliz[ing] on the momentum of 
women’s progress” by advancing social justice, improving women’s access to development 
support and giving them a louder voice in NGOs and social movements.
151
 While several, but 
not all, of the agreements have created institutions to establish a platform for the discussion 
of women’s issues, none seem to have succeeded in mainstreaming gender-consciousness 
into discussions at the highest institutional levels. 
Conclusion 
This paper found that 1) RTAs in the Western Hemisphere did not have a significant 
effect on introducing anti-discriminatory policies, changing wage inequality over time or 
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increasing female labor force participation. 2) Mercosur has had a slightly negative effect on 
FLFP and Caricom is negatively associated with the presence of domestic sexual harassment 
laws. 3) Only CAN was effective at increasing female labor force participation in the first 
years after signing the agreement. 4) Sexual harassment laws are not associated with higher 
levels of FLFP or wage equality, and finally 5) greater levels of land per person is associated 
with decreased levels of FLFP. 
As with many gender-related studies, the data collection was limited by the lack of 
available or complete gender-separated data sets, especially going back more than two 
decades. Small sample sizes and low variation limited the robustness and scope of this study. 
Fortunately, awareness of this issue is on the rise and gender-separated data is becoming 
more available all the time. Further research could build off the groundwork from this paper 
to continue to uncover policies and variables that affect female equality. For example, due to 
data limitations, this paper does not include findings on equality in political representation.  
There remains much to be researched in the relatively new field of gender and trade 
economics.  Research on individual trade agreements is highly preliminary, especially for 
small-economy agreements like CARICOM, CAFTA-DR, and ALBA. While existing 
literature has not yet fully agreed on the mechanisms and the extent to which trade 
liberalization affects women on a country by country basis, there is a general consensus that 
historically, on an international level, Asian women have benefitted while Latin American 
women have not. Yet this trend is now in reverse. This begs the question of whether Latin 
America will continue to see a rise in female labor force participation or if a defeminization 
of industry will occur in the future as Latin America progresses away from low-skilled 
production. Future research should carefully monitor Latin America for signs of regression in 
rates of female economic participation and equality.  
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There are very few comparative studies of how the various trading blocs in the 
Western Hemisphere have affected women differently. Despite progress in the realm of 
rhetoric and policy creation, the actual effects on women are negligible for all blocs. This 
study resonates in the current literature because the number of RTAs in the Western 
Hemisphere is on rise with the recent signing of the Pacific Alliance between Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and Costa Rica. Scholars should continue to research in this field to ensure that women, 
both in the Western Hemisphere and around the world, are not systematically excluded from 
the benefits of freer trade. 
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